Let be N the set of players and M the set of projects. The coalitional model of decision-making over the set of projects is formalized as family of games with different fixed coalitional partitions for each project that required the adoption of a positive or negative decision by each of the players. The players' strategies are decisions about each of the project. Players can form coalitions in order to obtain higher income. Thus, for each project a coalitional game is defined. In each coalitional game it is required to find in some sense optimal solution. Solving successively each of the coalitional games, we get the set of optimal n-tuples for all coalitional games. It is required to find a compromise solution for the choice of a project, i. e. it is required to find a compromise coalitional partition. As an optimality principles are accepted generalized PMS-vector and its modifications [1] , and compromise solution [5] . The proposed paper is the generalization of the paper "Static Model of Decision-making over the Set of Coalitional Partitions" [2] for the case when the preferences of players are different.
Introduction
The set of agents N and the set of projects M are given. Each agent fixed his participation or not participation in the project by one or zero choice. The participation in the project is connected with incomes or losses which the agents wants to maximize or minimize. Agents may form coalitions. This gives us an optimization problem which can be modeled as game. This problem we call static coalitional model of decision-making.
Denote players by i ∈ N and the projects by j ∈ M . The family M of different noncooperative games are considered. In each game G j , j ∈ M the player i has two strategies accept or reject the project. The payoff of player in each game is determined by strategies chosen by all players in this game G j . As it was mentioned before the players can form coalitions to increase the payoffs. In each game G j coalitional partition is formed and the problem is to find the optimal strategies for coalitions and the allocation of coalitional payoff between the members of coalition. The games G 1 , . . . , G m are solved by using the PMS-vector and its modifications [1] .
Then having the solutions of games G j , j = 1, m the new optimality principle − "the compromise solution" is proposed to select the best projects j * ∈ M .
Statement of the problem
Consider the following problem. Suppose N = {1 , . . . , n} is the set of players; M = {1 , . . . , m} is the set of projects, which require making positive or negative decision by each of the n players; X j i = {0 ; 1} is the set of pure strategies x j i of player i , i = 1, n. The strategy x j i can take the following values: x j i = 0 as a negative decision for the some project j and x j i = 1 as a positive decision; l i = 2 is the number of pure strategies of player i for all j; x j is the n-tuple of pure strategies chosen by the players;
is the set of n-tuples;
≥ 0, is the mixed strategy of player i, where ξ 0, j i is the probability of making negative decision by the player i for some project j, and ξ 1, j i is the probability of making positive decision correspondingly; M j i is the set of mixed strategies of i-th player; µ j is the n-tuple of mixed strategies chosen by players for some project j;
is the set of n-tuples in mixed strategies for some project j;
is the payoff function defined over the set X j for each player i , i = 1, n , and for some project j.
Thus, for a fixed project j we have noncooperative n-person game G j ( x j ):
Now suppose a coalitional partitions Σ j of the set N is defined for all j = 1 , m:
Then we have m simultaneous l-person coalitional games G j x j Σ j , j = 1 , m , in normal form associated with the game G j (x j ):
(2) Here for all j = 1 , m:
is the set of l-tuples in the game
is the number of l-tuples in pure strategies in the game
is the set of mixed strategiesμ
, is the mixed strategy, that is the set of mixed strategies of players from coalition S
is the set of l-tuples in mixed strategies. :X j → R 1 of coalition S j k for the fixed projects j, j = 1, m, and for the coalitional partition Σ j is defined under condition that:
where 3 Algorithm for solving the problem 3.1 Algorithm of constructing the generalized PMS-vector in a coalitional game.
Remind the algorithm of constructing the generalized PMS-vector [1] .
Calculate the values of payoffH
The payoff vector of coalitions in NE in mixed strategies is equal to E µ * , j
Payoff of coalition S j k in NE in mixed strategies is computed by formula 
where
is the number of elements in sets S j k (S ), and v (S ) are the maximal guaranteed payoffs for S ⊂ S k .
Moreover
Then PMS-vector in the NE in mixed strategies µ * , j
3.2 Algorithm for finding the set of compromise solutions.
We also remind the algorithm for finding a set of compromise solutions [2] , [5] . Step 1. Construct the ideal vector R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) , where R i = PMS j * i = max j PMS j i is the maximal value of payoff function of player i in NE on the set M , and j is the number of project j ∈ M .
Step 2. For each j find deviation of payoff function values for other players from the maximal value, that is ∆ Step 4. Choose the minimal deviation for all j from all maximal deviations among all players i ∆
